Arab
Commission for Human Rights
ARENA
(Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives)
Center for
Constitutional Rights · Economists for Peace and Security
Former UN
Humanitarian Coordinators in
Global
Exchange · Global Policy Forum · Hague Appeal for Peace
Institute
for Policy Studies · Instituto del
Tercer Mundo
International
Association of Democratic Lawyers
International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
International
Women’s Tribune Center · Iraq Analysis Group · Justitia
Universalis
Lawyers'
Committee on Nuclear Policy · Mennonite Central Committee
Protection
of Human Rights Defenders in the Arab World
Southern
Africa Human Rights NGO
Tavola
della Pace · UN Association
of
Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom
To: Security Council Permanent
Representatives
May 19, 2006
Dear Ambassador:
Resolution 1637 requires the Security
Council to review the mandate of the Multinational Force (MNF) in
We are writing to urge the Council to
conduct a rigorous and thorough review of these matters, using the standards of
international law and financial oversight which the international community
expects to be applied. As you are aware, the MNF stands accused of many serious
violations of international law. The DFI and the reconstruction programs have
been accused of widespread corruption and malfeasance. These are extremely
serious matters for the Council to investigate and to act upon.
In light of the Council’s impending
review, we call attention to the following issues:
1. Detentions and Prisons
The MNF has held thousands of Iraqi
prisoners for long periods without charge or trial.1
The great majority of such prisoners
have been denied fundamental rights such as contact with legal counsel and
family members.2 The MNF has denied human rights organizations’ repeated
requests for access to prisons and prisoners. The MNF has, apparently, even
denied the International Committee of the Red Cross full access to prisoners.3 According
to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the MNF 2 held an estimated
fourteen thousand prisoners as of February 2006 in four major prisons, as well
as many local detention centers.4 UNAMI also reports that the Government of Iraq holds about
fifteen thousand prisoners,5 and many sources confirm that these detainees are similarly
held without charge or trial and often under deplorable conditions.6 In spite
of numerous complaints by human rights organizations and by UN officials, the
MNF has continued these practices for more than three years and it has done
little to mitigate increasing detention violations by the Government of Iraq.
These are clear violations of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966).
2. Prisoner Abuse and Torture
In numerous detention centers and
prisons, MNF forces have subjected prisoners to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, identified by human rights authorities as abuse and torture. MNF
guards and interrogators have subjected Iraqi detainees to an array of physical
and psychological mistreatment, including severe and prolonged beating,
hooding, submersion in water, forced nudity, sexual abuse, sleep deprivation, suffocation,
electric shocks, threat by dogs, and other forms of humiliation and prolonged
exposure.7 The cases of torture in Abu Ghraib
prison are well-known to the whole world. In spite of MNF claims that such
practices have now ceased, high lycredible sources
suggest that illegal treatment continues.8
Amnesty International recently reported
that detainees are being held in
3. Use of Illegal, Indiscriminate
and Especially Injurious Weapons
The MNF has made use of indiscriminate
and especially injurious weapons that are banned by international convention or
widely considered unacceptable and inhuman.
The MNF has used MK-77,11 a
napalm-type weapon, as well as white phosphorus munitions.12 These
have been used directly against ground targets in densely populated areas,
under circumstances highly likely to affect civilian populations.13 These
weapons are extremely cruel – they stick to the flesh and burn victims to
death. They are also indiscriminate and have incinerated many innocent
civilians, including women and children. They are banned for these uses by Protocol III of the UN Convention
on Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively
Injurious Or To Have Indiscriminate Effects
(1980). During the 2003 invasion, the Coalition also made use of depleted
uranium14 and cluster bombs.15 Cluster bombs leave unexploded bomblets
that later cause civilian death and injury and also can harm civilians when
exploded in a populated area. Powder from exploded DU weapons is believed to
cause long-term negative health effects. Many consider one or both to violate
prohibitions against weapons that cause unnecessary suffering and
indiscriminate harm, contained in Protocol I of the
4. Attacks on
The Security Council has insisted on
the protection of civilians in armed conflict.16
But the MNF has repeatedly targeted
heavily-populated civilian centers, using aerial and ground bombardment and
heavy weapons. In addition to the two major offensives on Fallujah
in 2004, there have also been assaults on other cities and towns3 including al-Qaim, Tal Afar,
Article 14 of the Second
Protocol of the
5. Irregularities in Spending and
Lack of Oversight of the Development Fund for
In May 2003, the Security Council
created the Development Fund for
Resolution 1483 and the UN eventually
turned over US$9.978 billion to the Fund.23
The Fund also received income from
previously frozen funds and it has received regular revenues from
6. Gross Failure to Protect
Cultural Heritage
In spite of many warnings from
respected expert groups,30 the Coalition failed
to protect
The National Library was badly damaged
by fire and many of its archives were totally lost.31
Looters stole a large number of
important objects from the National Museum.32
Looters also damaged or destroyed
historic buildings and artifacts and looters began the wholesale pillage of
Iraq’s unprotected archeological sites.33
Subsequently, the MNF constructed a
military base on the archeological site of Babylon, where substantial damage
resulted.34 The MNF has failed to materially improve its protection of
historic buildings and archaeological sites. Rebuilding and restoration by the
MNF has been inadequate. Above all, the tragic and preventable looting of
7. Impunity
The rule of law cannot function in
conditions of impunity. The Security Council has affirmed the importance of the
rule of law and the end of impunity, as means towards peace and reconciliation.36 However,
the MNF has claimed broad impunity for its forces, for private security
personnel, for foreign military and civilian contractors, and 4 even for the
oil companies doing business with Iraq.37
The Iraqi people and their government
have virtually no legal recourse. The United States and other MNF members have
applied limited legal reckoning in a few flagrant cases of torture and gross
financial malfeasance, but even in the matter of torture, few cases have been thoroughly
reviewed and brought to justice, as a recent report by Human Rights Watch,
Human Rights First and the NYU School of Law makes clear.38 Those
with command responsibility have remained beyond the law. Since MNF officials
cite Council mandates (Resolutions 1483, 1511, and 1546) as a primary legal
basis for their action, the Council bears a special responsibility for these
practices of impunity.
In conclusion, we urge the Security Council to review the MNF mandate
rigorously and completely. At the very least, the Council could stipulate
specific standards of conduct for the MNF to bring it into conformity with
international law. For example, the Council could insist that detainees be
charged after a short period or be released; it could mandate that all
detention facilities be open to inspection by the ICRC and human rights
organizations; it could prohibit attacks upon civilian centers; it could rule
out the use of indiscriminate and especially injurious weapons; it could insist
on adequate protection of heritage sites; it could set a high and rigorously
enforced anticorruption standard; it could establish an absolute prohibition on
abuse and torture; and it could explore ways to end the practices of impunity.
We believe the time has come for the
Security Council to assume its responsibility, to thoroughly discuss these
matters in light of international law, to consult with the international
community, and to substantially reconsider, revise or terminate the mandate it
has given to the MNF.
Yours sincerely,
Violette
Daguerre
President
Arab Commission for Human Rights
Agnes Khoo
Executive Director
ARENA (Asian Regional Exchange
for New
Alternatives)
Peter Weiss
Vice-President
Center for Constitutional Rights
Lucy Law Webster
Board Member and UN Observer
Economists for Peace and Security
Denis J. Halliday,
Former UN Assistant Secretary
General and UN Humanitarian
Coordinator in
Hans von Sponeck
Former UN Assistant Secretary
General and UN Humanitarian
Coordinator in
Medea Benjamin
Co-Founder
Global Exchange
James A. Paul
Executive Director
Global Policy Forum
5
Cora Weiss
President
Hague Appeal for Peace
Phyllis Bennis,
Director New Internationalism
Project
Institute for Policy Studies
Roberto Bissio
Director
Instituto del Tercer Mundo
Jeanne Mirer
Secretary General
International Association of
Democratic Lawyers
Clarence Dias
President
Development
Sidiki Kaba
President
International Federation for Human
Rights (FIDH)
Vicki Semler
Executive Director
International Women’s Tribune
Center
Rachel Laurence
Senior Researcher
Iraq Analysis Group
Rachid Mesli
President
Justitia Universalis
John Burroughs
Executive Director
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear
Policy
Robb Davis
Executive Director
Mennonite Central Committee
Chris Toensing
Executive Director
Information Project
Greg Muttit
Researcher
PLATFORM
Haytham Manna
President
Protection of Human Rights
Defenders in the Arab World
Rehema Kerefu
National Coordinator
NGO
Flavio Lotti
National Coordinator
Tavola della Pace
John Langmore
National President
UN Association of
Else M. Adjali
NGO Representative to the UN,
Global Ministries
United
James E. Winkler
General Secretary, General Board of
Church and Society
United
International President
Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom
6
1 Amnesty International. Beyond Abu Ghraib:
Detention and Torture in
2 Amnesty International. Beyond Abu Ghraib:
Detention and Torture in
3 CPA Memorandum No. 3, section 6, para
8. The Memorandum further provides for the Iraqi Prisons and Detainee
Ombudsman
to have access to “security internees” but such access may also be denied “for
reasons of imperative
necessity as
an exceptional and temporary measure.”
4
UN Assistance
5 Ibid.
6 Human Rights Watch. New
7 Amnesty International. Beyond Abu Ghraib:
Detention and Torture in
8
Ibid,
25-41.
9 Amnesty International, US Government Creating a Climate of Torture (May 3, 2006).
10 Amnesty International. Beyond Abu Ghraib:
Detention and Torture in
11
12
Jason E.Levy:
“TTPs for the 60mm mortar section”. Infantry Magazine (May/June 2004) and Captain James T.
Cobb,
First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour and Sergeant
First Class William H. Hight: “The Fight for Fallujah”.
Field Artillery (March/April
2005).
13
Rai News 24, “Fallujah: La Strage Nascosta” [Fallujah: The hidden massacre] (November 2005).
14
Scott Peterson: “Remains of Toxic
Bullets Litter
15 Human Rights Watch. Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilians
Casualties in
16 UN Security Council Resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000),
and 1674 (2006).
17
Iraq Body Count estimates over 600
civilian casualties, while the John Hopkins mortality study suggests civilian
casualties
rates in the city that would be consistent with well over 10,000 deaths during
the spring and fall 2004
operations.
No official records have been compiled. John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
health. Iraqi
Civilian Deaths Increase Dramatically After Invasion (October 28, 2004).
18
Dr. Hafid al-Dulaimi, head of Fallujah’s
compensation commission, reports that 36,000 homes and
8,400 shops
were
destroyed. The destroyed homes would have sheltered about 200,000 people. Many
thousand additional
homes have
been so badly damaged as to be uninhabitable. [see
Steele and Jamail: “This Is our
Guardian (April
27, 2005)].
19
UNAMI, Situation Report (November
1-14, 2004).
20
21
Mike Marqusee:
“A Name that Lives in Infamy”. Guardian. (November 10, 2005).
22
Humanitarian Law Project/International
Educational Development (HLP/IED and San Francisco-based
Association
of Humanitarian Lawyers (AHL), submitted a petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human
Rights
of the Organization of American States on behalf of "unnamed, unnumbered
patients and medical staff both
living and
dead" at the medical facilities in Fallujah. The
OAS has registered the lawsuit as "Petition No. P-1258-04
23
UN Office of the Iraq Programme website reports that transfers of $1 billion each
were made on 28 May, 31
October
and 18 November 2003 from the United Nations Iraq escrow account, at the
request of the Security
Council
contained in paragraph 17 of resolution 1483 (2003) of 22 May 2003. Another
$2.6 billion was transferred
on 31
December 2003, a further $2 billion on 31 March and $0.5 billion on 19 April
2004. Three more transfers,
totaling
$1.128 billion, were made in 2004 and three transfers totaling $0.75 billion
have been made in 2005.
24 Christian Aid.
25
The IAMB expressed concern over no-bid
contracts in a letter to Ambassador Paul Bremer of April 5, 2004. Ref:
IAMB – 6.
Further, in December 2004, Iraq Revenue Watch reported that “Seventy-three
percent of the value of
contracts
worth over $5 million and paid for with DFI funds were not competitively bid.” Revenue Watch. Briefing
Number
9, Audit Finds More Irregularities
and Mismanagement of
26 Revenue Watch. Briefing Number 9, op cit, notes one case highlighted in a 2004 IAMB report where
$774,300
was stolen
from a division’s vault. See “Development Fund for
Disbursements for the period from 1 January 2004 to 28 June
2004,” KPMG Bahrain (September 2004), 23.
27
See for example the Office of the
Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Third Quarterly
Report to Congress (October
30, 2004), Appendix J, DoD
Status Report on
Report of Factual Findings in connection with
Disbursements, continued for the period from 1 January 2004 to 28
June 2004, or other IAMB, CPA-IG and SIGIR reports.
28
Jonathan Finer: “US Report Cites
Progress, Shortfalls In
29
As examined in a recent Iraqi Oil
Ministry Report, described in Jim Muir: “Iraq Oil Gangs Syphon
off Billions,”
Telegraph (April
28, 2006).
30
Including the Archeological
31
“Prized Iraqi Annals Lost ‘In Blaze’” BBC (April
14, 2003).
32
John F. Burns: “
7
33 UNESCO News Service, “First Experts Meeting on the Iraqi
Cultural Heritage” (April 17, 2003).
34
British Museum, Report on Meeting at
35
Mark Fischer: “Tomb Raiders”. Index on Censorship (February 2006) and reproduced in the Guardian (January
19, 2006).
36
UN Security Council Presidential
Statement on Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations Role.
S/PRST/2004/34
(October 6, 2004).
37
Coalition Provisional Authority. Order 17. CPA/ORD/27
June 2004/17.
38
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First,
and NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, By the
Numbers: Findings of the Detainee Abuse and
Accountability Project (April
2006).